We continue now with an analysis of the ethical dilemma posed by use of atomic bombs on Japanese cities. This exercise as defined in the last post seems to meet the standard of virtue ethics in light of the careful approach we are taking. We need only identify the morally balanced center between two extremes: (1) intentionally or negligently prolonging the war with its awful consequences and (2) ending the war at any cost – including dishonor, injustice, and a lingering threat of an aggressive totalitarian state. Here I believe the soonest possible conclusion of the war on FDR’s terms of unconditional surrender is the correct or at least a reasonable ethical choice.
Second, since I am not reconsidering the facts entering into the decision, we must assume the choice made in 1945 by President Truman and his advisors is the correct utilitarian decision as that was the basis for their decision. This is to say that deaths and illnesses caused by the two atomic bombs were most likely less than would be reasonably expected from a full scale invasion of Japan and additional fighting in the other Pacific theatres.
This brings us to Kantian deontology where dropping the atomic bomb becomes troublesome. We might accept the universalizability of the decision – that is, the use of nuclear weapons is universally acceptable in defense of a large unprovoked, attack by an aggressor state – since most states including our own would in theory never choose this course. However there seems no way to meet Kant’s moral imperative to treat all sentient beings not as means, but as ends. 
The annihilation of secondary cities occupied by mostly (or entirely) innocent residents in order to persuade Japanese leaders to surrender is clearly treating those sacrificed as a mere means to a rapid end of the war. It might be defensible as retributive justice if the Japanese leaders responsible for the attack (or perhaps military installations) were the main targets, but that was deliberately not the case.
In conclusion, after this analysis, I could not personally choose to use the atomic bomb as it was used despite the defensibility of that choice by Utilitarian ethics. If I could not avoid deciding, I would choose to use it first on an unoccupied area of Japan or second on the largest possible military target (both thought at the time to be ineffective for concluding the war). I might be able to endorse a third choice – use on the center of leadership, presumably an area of Tokyo, where retributive justice would more fairly apply, although national chaos in Japan would likely have been the result. Of course a great country may not be able to follow the Golden Rule under conditions of war, in which case, the ethical choice for persons like me is to avoid or refuse becoming the decision maker, that is, the President.
Next time we pick back up with the theological perspective of ultimate reality.
